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Intramilitary Tort Immunity: A
Constitutional Justification
I. INTRODUCTION
Intramilitary tort immunity has been the subject of considerable
criticism by commentators' and has been questioned by several
1. See, e.g., Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons of War, 29
ST. Louis U.L.J. 383 (1985) (arguing against the mechanistic application of Feres v.
United States and asserting that disciplinary considerations underlying the doctrine
compel reversal); Howland, The Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 93 (1985) (advocating direct involvement of civilian courts in intramilitary tort ac-
tions, justified by the lack of adequate administrative remedies as well as a need to
provide civilian values); Steinman, Backing off Bivens and the Ramifications of this
Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984)
(discussing military tort claims brought directly under the context of the first amend-
ment, arguing that "raising of the barriers to recovery under the Constitution was not
convincingly supported, and enhanced the risk that the constitutional rights of some
people, in some circumstances, [ie. military personnel] will be so unenforceable as to
violate constitutional minima." Id. at 269-70); Comment, Constitutional Tort Remedies:
A Proposed Amendment To The Federal Tort Claims Act, 12 CONN. L. REV. 492 (1980)
(criticizing the "incident to service" test as outmoded, and resting upon a legal fiction;
advocates amending the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to allow servicemen to al-
lege violations of a constitutionally protected interest to sue arising under the Consti-
tution of the United States, thereby extending FTCA coverage to all torts) (hereinafter
Comment, A Proposed Amendment]; Note, From Feres to StenceL Should Military
Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1979) (asserting that
the Feres exemption to the F'rCA is unnecessary since the role of the Feres doctrine is
adequately fulfilled by the "discretionary function" exception of the FTCA, which ex-
cludes government liability for claims stemming from "discretionary" activity by the
government or its employees) [hereinafter Note, From Feres to Stencel]; Comment, The
Feres Doctrine: Has It Created Remediless Wrongs For Relatives of Servicemen?, 44 U.
PITT. L. REV. 929, 952-53 (1983) (advocating a narrower definition of the phrase, "inci-
dent to service," entailing case-by-case analysis of whether policies underlying the
Feres doctrine would be served by denying claimant a cause of action) [hereinafter
Comment, The Feres Doctrine]; Note, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A
Proposed Reform of the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992 (1986) (asserting that military
remedies do not adequately deter or compensate victims of military misconduct; advo-
cates general rule allowing intentional or constitutional tort claims by former service-
men) [hereinafter Note, Intramilitary Tort Law]. But see Fii1man, Intramilitary Tort
Law: Incidence to Service Meets Constitutional Tort, 60 N.C.L. REV. 489 (1982) (pro-
posing that most intramilitary disputes be removed from the courts and that Congress
authorize a form of administrative relief for uncompensated servicemen); Hirschhorn,
The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional
Rights, 62 N.C.L. REV. 177 (1984) (presenting comprehensive analysis of military rights
and relationships under Constitution, concludes that civil courts are justified in treat-
ing military as a separate community).
courts.2 Denial of civil relief to servicemembers injured in the course
of military duty has generally been justified by the lack of a legisla-
tive waiver of the protection afforded the federal government under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.3 Litigants have unsuccessfully
attempted to overcome this hurdle by bringing intramilitary tort
claims under both the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)4 and directly
under the Constitution5 under the theory of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.6
During the 1987 term, the Supreme Court reviewed United States
v. Stanley,7 in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had al-
lowed an injured serviceman to bring a cause of action under both
the FTCA and a constitutional tort theory.8 In Stanley, the Supreme
Court reiterated its commitment to the doctrine established in Feres
v. United States9 and established a per se rule that no cause of action
exists under Bivens to members of the Armed Forces for injury inci-
dent to service.10
This Comment will attempt to reconcile the rationale supporting
the Feres doctrine, which bars recovery under the FTCA, with the
Supreme Court's denial in Chappell v. Wallace1" of a right of action
under a constitutional tort theory, and also with the Court's more re-
cent decision in Stanley. This inquiry will take a step beyond the
question of whether the federal government has consented to be sued
2. See, e.g., Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986) (army veteran
allegedly injured by unknowingly ingesting lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) while
participating as volunteer in program purportedly organized to test chemical warfare
equipment), vacated in part, rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987); Stanley v. Central
Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (army veteran brought suit alleging
injury caused by Army's negligent administration of LSD to human subjects including
plaintiff), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3262 (1987); Hampton v. United States, 575 F. Supp.
1180 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (former serviceman brought suit alleging injury sustained as re-
sult of exposure to radiation during atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons).
3. See generally Comment, The Feres Doctrine, supra note 1.
4. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987); see, e.g., United States v.
Shearer, 105 S. Ct. 3039 (1985); Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666
(1977); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
5. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); Stanley v. United States, 786
F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated in part, rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987); Jaffee
v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
6. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized that damages may be obtained for
injuries sustained as a consequence of violation of a citizen's fourth amendment rights
by a federal official.
7. 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
8. See Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated in
part, rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
9. 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see infra text accompanying notes 21-32.
10. Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority, made the Court's position on the is-
sue clear: "We hold that no Bivens remedy is available for injuries that 'arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service.'" Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063.
11. 462 U.S. 296 (1983); see infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
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by such claimants, and will consider whether an intramilitary tort
claim presents a justiciable controversy. This Comment will also
consider the policies underlying intramilitary tort immunity and ex-
amine the existing congressionally created disciplinary12 and com-
pensatory13  remedies designed to deter tortious conduct and
compensate injured servicemembers. It will then contrast them to
the policies and remedies of civil tort law. Finally, this Comment
will conclude with the recommendation that in as much as the Con-
stitution expressly assigns to Congress the responsibility for "the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"14 the ju-
diciary should continue to refrain from interfering in intramilitary
relationships, and defer to the legislative branch to monitor the effec-
tiveness of the existing scheme of compensation and deterrence.
II. THE FERES DOCTRINE
Prior to 1946, the United States government was immune from all
law suits under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.15 However, this
immunity could be waived, as where the government consented to be
sued.16 In the absence of consent, "[r]elief was often sought and
sometimes granted through private bills in Congress."17 However,
12. See infra note 96.
13. See infra note 97.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
15. United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (1 How.) 286, 288 (1846). The concept of
sovereign immunity evolved from the common law doctrine that the king could do no
wrong. Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 1, at 1099 n.4.
Professor Ogden has described the doctrine as follows:
Under the sovereign immunity doctrine, governments are immune from law
suits that are based on their sovereign conduct unless the government con-
sents to suit. This doctrine, imported from monarchial England, was adopted
by colonial American common law and remained undisturbed by the Ameri-
can Revolution. Although the United States Constitution does not address
sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court embraced the doctrine at an early
date. Indeed, the federal government's immunity to suit unfortunately re-
mains an important feature of the common law today. Not until it passed the
Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 did the federal government consent to ...
liability for torts that arise from sovereign acts or omissions by the govern-
ment or its agencies. The FTCA, however, contains numerous exceptions that
significantly undermine its general waiver of immunity.
Ogden, Entity Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: An Analysis and a Propo-
sal for Changes in the Law, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 907, 908-09 (1982). See also Pound, The
Tort Claim Act: Reason or History?, 30 NAT'L Assoc. CLAIMANT'S COMPENSATION L.J.
404, 406-09 (1964) (providing excellent historical discussion of doctrine of sovereign
immunity).
16. "IT]he government is not liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given
by law." McLemore, 45 U.S. (1 How.) at 288.
17. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
since the congressional machinery' 8 proved inadequate to handle
such claims, Congress was prompted to enact the Federal Tort
Claims Act in 1946.19 The FTCA waives immunity for civil tort
claims and transfers the burden of examining such claims to the
courts. 20 Four years later, in Feres v. United States,2 1 the Supreme
Court was asked to interpret the FTCA and determine if Congress
had intended the Act to waive governmental immunity in suits
where a servicemember claimed injury incident to military service. 22
The Court adopted a narrow construction of the FTCA and declined
to include such injuries within its scope.2 3
In denying servicemembers a right of action under the FTCA,24 the
Feres Court focused upon several factors which suggested that Con-
gress had not intended to waive immunity for service-related claims:
First, the relationship between the Government and members . . . is "dis-
tinctly federal in character" [citation omitted]; it would make little sense to
have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services dependent
18. Id,
19. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987); id §§ 2671-80 (West 1965 & Supp.
1987).
20. Section 2674 of title 28 of the United States Code states in part: "The United
States shall be liable ... [for] tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances .... I& § 2674 (West 1965).
21. 340 U.S. 135, 136-38 (1950).
22. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). Three cases involving "injury
incident to military service" were consolidated in the decision. In Feres, the executrix
of a deceased serviceman sought recovery for the serviceman's death in a barracks fire.
The plaintiff alleged that the serviceman's superiors had negligently quartered him in
barracks known, or which should have been known, to be unsafe. Id, at 137. In Jeffer-
son v. United States, one of the cases consolidated with Fetes, the plaintiff alleged
medical malpractice stemming from an operation he received while in the Army dur-
ing which a towel marked "Medical Department U.S. Army" was left inside his stom-
ach. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137. In United States v. Griggs, also consolidated with Feres, the
executrix of a deceased serviceman alleged that the serviceman died while on active
duty due to negligent and unskillful medical treatment by Army surgeons. Feres, 340
U.S. at 137. All three plaintiffs attempted to state a cause of action under the FTCA.
Id, at 138.
23. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, summarized the Court's position as
follows:
We conclude that the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service. Without exception, the relationship of
military personnel to the Government has been governed exclusively by fed-
eral law. We do not think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created a new
cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected injuries or death
due to negligence. We cannot impute to Congress such a radical departure
from established law in the absence of express congressional command.
Id at 146.
24. The Feres Court, however, observed that the language of the FTCA includes
within its definition of "employee of the government.., members of the military or
naval forces ... acting within the scope of [their] office or employment .. Id. at 138
(quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (West 1965)). One commentator focused upon this broad
definition of government employees as an indication that Congress intended to waive
immunity to servicemembers on active duty except in time of war. See, e.g., Comment,
The Feres Doctrine, supra note 1, at 933-34.
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upon the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at the time of
injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act 2 5 establishes, as a substitute for
tort liability, a statutory "no fault" compensation scheme which provides gen-
erous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to any negligence attrib-
utable to the government .... 26 [Third,] "the peculiar and special relationship
of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on
discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort
Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts commit-
ted in the course of military duty."2 7
The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to create "a new
cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected injuries
or death due to negligence." 28
In support of this construction of the FTCA, the Court observed
that "[w]ithout exception, the relationship of military personnel to
the Government has been governed exclusively by Federal law."2 9
Because the Feres Court was concerned that its narrow construction
of the statute might be erroneous, and due to the lack of materials
with which to determine congressional intent, the Feres Court im-
pliedly invited Congress to effect a remedy.30 Congress, however, has
remained conspicuously silent over the years since Feres regarding
this issue.31 Although Congress has had ample opportunity to amend
25. At the time the Feres case was brought, the Veterans' Benefit Act had not yet
been enacted, but when Feres was decided, the laws relating to veterans' compensation
were codified under title 38 of the United States Code. Comment, The Feres Doctrine,
supra note 1, at 936 n.40. See also Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 1, at 1106
n.43.
26. See infra text accompanying and following note 122.
27. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977) (citation
omitted).
28. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
29. Id.
30. Justice Jackson observed:
There are few guiding materials for our task of statutory construction. No
committee reports or floor debates disclose what effect the statute was
designed to have on the problem before us, or that it even was in mind. Under
these circumstances, no conclusion can be above challenge, but if we misinter-
pret the Act, at least Congress possesses a ready remedy.
Id. at 138.
31. In the years since the Feres decision, there have been several attempts to
amend the FrCA to encompass claims of servicemembers injured incident to military
service. Proposed amendments have taken various forms tailored to the political cli-
mate of the time. Representative of these proposed amendments are H.R. 2659, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1979) and S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which would have
altered the FTCA to allow suits against the United States "not only for the common
law torts committed by federal employees 'within the scope of their employment' but
also for the constitutional wrongs committed either 'within the scope of' or 'under
color of office.'" Comment, A Proposed Amendment, supra note 1, at 531. H.R. 2659
and S. 695 were modifications of prior measures rejected by the 95th Congress: S. 3314,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 11,048 (1978), and S. 2117, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123
the Act, it has nevertheless allowed the Feres doctrine to stand for
over thirty years.32 This protracted legislative silence demonstrates
congressional acquiescence with the status quo.
Of the factors analyzed by the Feres court, the most significant is
the Court's obvious concern for maintaining the independence of the
military, and the negative effects which the recognition of intramili-
tary tort claims would likely have upon the discipline and effective-
ness of the armed forces. In the cases following Feres, the Court has
gradually shifted its emphasis from statutory construction to an in-
quiry involving the weighing of the availability of an adequate rem-
edy, the possible effects of inconsistent state law, and the
constitutional relationship between the legislative and judicial
branches of the federal government. Subsequent cases decided by
the Supreme Court have expanded the Feres doctrine and refined its
rationale, but continue to rest primarily upon a strict construction of
the text of the FTCA.
In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,33 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its commitment to the Feres construction of the
FTCA, and expanded the doctrine to encompass third-party indem-
nity actions.3 4 The Stencel court applied the three-factor analysis uti-
CONG. REC. 15,284 (1977); see Comment, A Proposed Amendment, supra note 1, at 530
n.178. A proposal which would have allowed servicemembers to sue the United States
for injuries sustained due to medical malpractice incident to military service, H.R.
3174, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), was rejected by the 99th Congress. A similar mea-
sure is pending before the 100th Congress. See infra note 32.
32. A proposal to amend the FrCA, H.R. 1054, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), is cur-
rently before the House of Representatives. H.R. 1054 would "amend chapter 171 of
title 28, United States Code to allow members of the Armed Forces to sue the United
States for damages for certain injuries caused by improper medical care .... " H.R.
REP. No. 279, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987). The Bill would allow claims to be
brought for personal injury or death to a member of the Armed Forces occurring
while on active duty. H.R. REP. No. 279, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4. However, the in-
jury must arise out of medical or dental care provided to the servicemember in a fixed
medical facility operated by the United States or Secretary of a military department.
Id. The measure further provides for the reduction of any judgment by an amount
equal to the present value of any benefits the servicemember may be entitled to re-
ceive from the government. H.R. REP. No. 279, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5. A similar
measure, H.R. 3174, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), was introduced in the 99th Congress.
See H.R. REP. No. 288, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). House Resolution 3174 was passed
by the House, but stalled in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The current measure
has been approved by the House, and is given a 53% chance of surviving the Senate
vote. Billcast, George Mason Univ. (1987) (Billcast is a service provided by George Ma-
son University and available on WESTLAW).
33. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). In Stencel, a National Guard Officer sued defendant
Stencel, who cross-claimed against the government for indemnity. The Court held
that a third party indemnity action was barred for essentially the same reasons that a
direct claim by the serviceman is barred by Feres. Id. at 674-75.
34. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, opined:
The factors considered by the Feres court are largely applicable in this type of
case as well; hence, the right of a third party to recover in an indemnity action
against the United States... must be held limited by the rationale of Feres
where the injured party is a serviceman.
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lized in Feres and denied the plaintiff's claim for indemnity in a
products liability action.35
More recently, however, in United States v. Shearer,36 Chief Jus-
tice Burger's opinion revealed a shift in the focus of the Court's anal-
ysis. The opinion states:
[I]n the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the "peculiar and special
relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of
such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits
under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negli-
gent acts committed in the course of military duty.' 3 7
The opinion's emphasis on the need for determining whether a ser-
vicemember's suit requires "the civilian court to second-guess mili-
tary decisions, and whether the suit might impair essential military
decisions"38 raised the prudential concern of maintaining judicial re-
spect for the role of the military and the unique requirements of mil-
itary discipline. The Supreme Court's analysis of intramilitary tort
Id& at 674.
35. In its analysis of third-party indemnity claims, the Stencel court concluded
that the relationship between the government and its suppliers is no "less distinctively
federal in character" than the relationship contemplated in Feres (between the govern-
ment and its soldiers). Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672
(1977). The Court also justified the inference that Congress had not intended liability
to hinge on the vagaries of state law. Id The Court relied on the military compensa-
tion scheme of the Veterans' Benefits Act as an upper limit of governmental liability
for service-connected injuries. Id. at 673. Finally, the Stencel Court observed that a
trial of a third-party indemnity claim would involve the second-guessing of military or-
ders, with an effect upon military discipline identical to that contemplated by a direct
action filed by a servicemember: Members of the armed forces would have to testify as
to the propriety of each others' decisions and orders. Id Justice Marshall's dissent at-
tacked the majority's conclusions as to each of the three factors utilized under the
Feres analysis. He argued that the "distinctively federal" relationship between the
government and the military is no less "unique and nationwide" than that of the gov-
ernment and other agencies. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp v. United States, 431 U.S. 666,
674-75 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further observed that nothing
in the Veterans' Benefits Act suggests it was intended to place the burden of fully
compensating injured servicemen upon third-parties where the government is at fault.
Id. at 675. Finally, Marshall argued that disciplinary considerations are not factors to
be considered where "a nonmilitary third party brings suit." Id, at 676 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
36. 473 U.S. 52 (1985). In Shearer, the plaintiff was the mother of an Army Pri-
vate who had been murdered by a fellow serviceman. Id. at 53. Private Shearer was
kidnapped and murdered by another Army Private who was eventually convicted and
sentenced to a term of 5 to 55 years' imprisonment. Id. Mrs. Shearer asserted that her
son's murderer had been previously convicted of manslaughter by a German court in
1977 and imprisoned there for 4 years. Id at 54. Mrs. Shearer alleged that her son's
murder resulted from the Army's failure to adequately supervise and control the per-
petrator, whom they knew to be dangerous. Id.
37. Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963)).
38. Id.
immunity in Shearer expanded the inquiry beyond what had previ-
ously been strictly a task of statutory construction, to include an as-
sessment of the constitutional relationship between the judicial
branch of the federal government and the military establishment.39
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CLAIMS
The recognition of constitutional tort claims in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics 4o served as the catalyst
for a re-examination of intramilitary tort immunity. In an effort to
avoid the narrow construction of the FTCA mandated by Feres and
its progeny, litigants have attempted to state a cause of action di-
rectly under the United States Constitution 4' using a Bivens the-
ory.42 As a general rule, the courts have denied relief in these cases
by referring to the rationale stated in Feres, with increasing emphasis
upon the presence or absence of a "peculiar and special relationship
of the soldier to his superiors . . ."43 Without the FTCA's express
bar of sovereign immunity to rely upon, these courts have been
forced to consider the merits of intramilitary tort claims directly, and
to provide an independent rationale for denying servicemembers this
right of action.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with a military
Bivens claim in Joffee v. United States.44 In denying the plaintiff
39. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
40. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
41. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 6. The awarding of monetary damages for constitutional viola-
tions recognized in Bivens has been criticized as an infringment on the legislative func-
tion and policy vested in Congress by the Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The political question analysis, discussed infra at notes 64-68 and accompanying text,
could well be applied to Bivens claims in general. However, the Supreme Court is ap-
parently willing to accept this infringement of Congressional authority. Professor
Steinman observes: "[lit now seems to be settled that the federal courts do have power
to award money damages against federal officials in order to vindicate constitutional
rights whether or not Congress has expressly authorized such suits." Steinman, supra
note 1, at 278.
Professor Steinman further comments that: "The courts' power to [entertain Bivens
claims] ... springs from the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts to decide all
cases 'aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'" Id.
This view overlooks the fact that the Constitution makes explicit grants of plenary au-
thority to each branch of government. For a detailed discussion of Bivens and its prog-
eny, see generally Whitman, Government Responsibility For Constitutional Torts, 85
MICH. L. REV. 225 (1986); Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 597 (1982).
43. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299 (1983) (quoting United States v. Muniz,
374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963)); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1232 (3rd Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982) (quoting United States v. Brown, 345 U.S. 110, 112
(1954)).
44. 663 F.2d 1226 (1981) (former soldier who was compelled to participate in an at-
mospheric atomic weapons test in which he was directly exposed to radiation without
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constitutional tort recovery, the Joffee court referred to "the hard
policy choices already made by the Supreme Court in a series of re-
lated but different cases .... ,,45 The Jaffee court expanded upon the
prudential aspects of the Shearer Court's application of the Feres
doctrine:
Suits for service injuries would also appear to have a related effect on the
decisionmaking [sic] of military authorities who give orders. Military Aeci-
sionmakers might not be willing to act as quickly and forcefully as is neces-
sary, especially during battlefield conditions, if they know they will
subsequently be called into a civilian court for their actions.
46
The Supreme Court was confronted with the validity of intramili-
tary constitutional tort claims in Chappell v. Wallace.47 Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated unequivocally that
"enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover dam-
ages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations."4 8
Several lower courts have read Chappell as establishing a per se rule
against recovery by servicemembers on a constitutional tort theory.49
As the Jaffee court correctly foresaw, the Supreme Court in Chappell
employed the Feres rationale to justify a narrow construction of the
FTCA.50 However, the Court focused its analysis upon the constitu-
protection); see also Veteran's Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons's Test-
ing: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). See generally Favish, Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shifting the
Burden of Proof on Factual Causation, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 933 (1981); Note, Intramili-
tary Tort Law, supra note 1, at 994 n.16.
45. Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1228.
46. Id. at 1232.
47. 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (Navy enlistees brought action alleging subjection to racial
discrimination by superior officers while stationed aboard ship).
48. Id. at 305.
49. See, e.g., Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d. 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1100 (1984) (discharged Air Force officer denied recovery for injury from alleged
conspiracy to have him removed from flight duty and ultimately from service); Gas-
pard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 975
(1984) (former Army enlistee denied recovery for injuries allegedly sustained from ex-
posure to radiation during atmospheric atomic weapons testing in 1950's); Alvarez v.
Wilson, 600 F. Supp. 706, 710 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (naval officer denied recovery for injury
allegedly sustained as result of intentional racial discrimination); Benvenuti v. Depart-
ment of Defense, 587 F. Supp. 348, 353 (D.C. 1984) (army physician denied recovery for
alleged injury stemming from involuntary dismissal from service); Hampton v. United
States, 575 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (former serviceman denied recovery
for alleged injury due to exposure to atmospheric nuclear weapons testing). But see,
Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1986) (former serviceman stated
cause of action for violation of right to privacy for injury allegedly incurred by Army's
surreptitious administration of LSD), vacated in part, rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct. 3054
(1987).
50. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299. Chief Justice Burger observed: "Although this case
concerns the limitations on the type of nonstatutory damages remedy recognized in
tional relationship between the Congress and the military, and em-
phasized the need for judicial restraint in legitimate Army matters.5 1
The approach of the Chappell Court is a decided departure from
the Feres rationale. Prior to the creation of constitutional tort claims
in Bivens, the Supreme Court had avoided this difficult question
through the expedience of statutory construction. In Ch7appell, how-
ever, the Court was forced to confront the sensitive policy considera-
tions of intramilitary civil tort immunity without the FTCA as a
backstop.
The Chappell Court instead utilized the limitation placed upon con-
stitutional tort recovery set forth in Bivens. The Bivens Court ob-
served that a remedy was available, since under the facts presented,
there were "no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress."52 This qualification led to the infer-
ence, confirmed in Chappell, that in the presence of such "special fac-
tors," no Bivens remedy would be granted.
In Chappell, Chief Justice Burger applied the special factors analy-
sis and found them to be present in the "peculiar and special rela-
tionship of the soldier to his superiors."53 The concerns of the
Chappell Court were expressed by the Court in the following state-
ment: "Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before en-
tertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established
relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior
officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique
structure of the Military Establishment." 54 Thus, the Chappell opin-
ion was really dealing with a question of justiciability, although the
decision was veiled by the special factors language of Bivens.
Most recently, in United States v. Stanley,55 the Supreme Court re-
versed the Eleventh Circuit's determination that Chappell did not per
se bar Bivens claims by servicemembers injured in the course of mili-
tary service.56 In Stanley, the Court rejected the case-by-case special
factors analysis suggested by the Eleventh Circuit.57 Rather, Justice
Bivens, rather than Congress' intent in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
Court's analysis in Feres guides our analysis in this case."
51. Id. at 301. The Chappell court relied upon language in Bivens which qualified
the recognition of a right of action for damages for the violation of one's constitutional
rights. Id. at 298. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
52. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971).
53. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112
(1954)).
54. Id.
55. 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3060-65 (1987); see supra note 2.
56. 786 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated in par4 rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct.
3054 (1987).
57. In Stanley the Eleventh Circuit had applied the qualifying language of Bivens
to justify an exception to the rule established in Chappell. The Eleventh Circuit held:
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Scalia's opinion observed: "The 'special factor that counsel['s] hesita-
tion' is not the fact that Congress has chosen to afford some manner
of relief in the particular case, but the fact that congressionally unin-
vited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is inappropri-
ate."5 8  The Court expressly followed the narrow construction
accorded the FTCA in Feres, and held "that no Bivens remedy is
available for injuries that arise out of or... in the course of activity
incident to service."5 9 Like Chappell, the Stanley opinion is based
upon a clearly enunciated concern for the justiciability of intramili-
tary claims for monetary damages as compensation for violation of a
servicemember's constitutional rights.60
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never forthrightly framed
the intramilitary tort immunity issue in terms of justiciability, even
though other federal courts have done so. 61 The competence of the
courts to decide questions relating to the management and utilization
of the military has long been a concern of the Supreme Court. As
"A Bivens cause of action may be defeated in a particular case ... where the defendant
demonstrates either that there are 'special factors counseling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress,' or that Congress has provided an 'equally effective'
alternate remedy .. " Id. at 1494-95. The court distinguished the plaintiff's situation
from that of the servicemen in Chappell. Id. at 1496. The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that since the plaintiff in Stanley was involved in a voluntary testing program adminis-
tered by both civilian and military personnel, and since the Veteran's Benefits Act was
inadequate to compensate him, he was entitled to a Bivens remedy. Id, at 1497.
58. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063.
59. Id. (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
60. Justice Scalia observed:
Today, no more than when we wrote Chappell, do we see any reason why our
judgment in the Bivens context should be any less protective of military con-
cerns than it has been with respect to FTCA suits.... In fact, if anything we
might have felt more free to compromise military concerns in the latter con-
text, since we were confronted with an explicit congressional authorization...
for Congress "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces," U.S. Const. Art. I. § 8, cl. 14, and rely upon inference for
our own authority to allow money damages ....
Id at 3062 (emphasis in original).
61. See, e.g., Dumas v. President of the United States, 554 F. Supp. 10 (D. Conn.
1982). In Dumas, the plaintiff alleged that the constitutional rights of his brother, a
Private in the United States Army, were violated by the government's failure to obtain
his timely release from a Korean prisoner-of-war camp. The court held that the plain-
tiff's claim raised "legal issues [which] presented non-justiciable political questions
which are constitutionally committed to the Executive and Legislative Branches of the
Government and thus are not reviewable by the courts." Id. at 15; see also Steinman,
supra note 1, at 291 n.106.
the Court stated in Gilligan v. Morgan:6 2
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental
action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political
branches directly responsible--as the judicial branch is not-to the electoral
process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activ-
ity in which the courts have less competence.6 3
The fundamental justification for the bar to intramilitary civil tort
recovery is not the judicially created exception to the FTCA under
Feres, nor is it the existence of special factors counseling hesitation
under Bivens; these are simply important elements of the threshold
constitutional analysis. That fundamental analysis is the aspect of
justiciability referred to as the "political question" doctrine.
The classic formulation of the political question doctrine64 is found
in the Supreme Court's opinion in Baker v. Carr.65 Baker is ex-
panded in Justice Powell's concurring memorandum in Goldwater v.
Carter,66 which incorporated the following three inquiries: "(i) Does
the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the
Constitution to a coordinate branch of the Government? (ii) Would
resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of
judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against
such judicial intervention?" 67 These three factors form an analytical
framework for determining whether intramilitary tort claims present
a justiciable issue within the jurisdiction of the civil judiciary, or a
nonjusticiable political question delegated exclusively by the Consti-
62. 413 U.S. 1 (1973); see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
63. ld, at 10.
64. The so-called political question doctrine is founded upon judicial respect for
the authority vested by the Constitution in the legislative and executive branches of
the federal government. The courts have determined that it would be inappropriate
for them to review actions taken by the coordinate branches, since those branches are
subject to periodic review by the electorate. One commentator has described the polit-
ical question doctrine as follows:
That there are political questions-issues to be resolved and decisions to be
made by the political branches of government and not by the courts-is axio-
matic in a system of government built on the separation of powers. The fed-
eral courts exercise neither the "legislative Powers" nor "the executive
Power" of the United States. They do not tax and spend, borrow or coin
money, regulate commerce, establish rules of naturalization or exercise any of
the other powers vested by the Constitution in Congress; nor make treaties,
appoint officers, command the armed forces or make other [such] deci-
sions.... The courts exercise the Judicial power of the United States, deciding
cases and controversies arising under the Constitution and under the laws and
treaties of the United States-laws and treaties made by the political
branches.
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); see also
Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 387, 409 (1984).
65. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (action brought by Tennessee voters under the civil rights
statute, contending that state apportionment statute was unconstitutional).
66. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 998.
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tution to the legislative branch.6 8
A. Textual Commitment
The Constitution allocates military matters between the executive
and legislative branches of the federal government. The textual com-
mitment of military affairs to the legislative branch of the govern-
ment is reflected in article I, section 8 of the Constitution:
The Congress shall have the Power To . .. provide for the common Defense
... to raise and support Armies... To provide and maintain a Navy; To make
rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States
.... 69
The commitment of military affairs to the executive branch appears
in article II, section 2, which designates the President as "Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the militia of the several States, when called into actual service of the
United States." 70
The Supreme Court has been consistent in its determination that
the Constitution contains an explicit grant to Congress of plenary au-
thority over the military.71 The Court summed up its view of Con-
68. It is important to distinguish a direct claim for damages as compensation for
tortious conduct, from appellate review of a military administrative action. The
Supreme Court's position regarding review of military administrative decisions is as
yet unclear. See Note, supra note 64 at 390-96. However, several lower federal courts
have found the issue to be justiciable. The most prominent example of such review is
Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). The Mindes court established a widely
utilized test which has been followed in eight judicial circuits. See, e.g., Stinson v.
Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1987); Sandidge v. Washington, 813 F.2d 1025 (9th
Cir. 1987); Holdiness v. Stroud, 808 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1987); Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Penagaricano v. Uenza, 747 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1984); Lindenau v. Alex-
ander, 663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1981); Williams v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 1187
(E.D.N.C. 1982); benShalome v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis.
1980); Cushing v. Tetter, 478 F. Supp. 960 (D.R.I. 1979).
The Mindes test consists of a two-stage inquiry: first, "no review of internal military
affairs may take place unless the plaintiff alleges either (a) the deprivation of a consti-
tutional right or (b) violation by the military of a congressional statute or its own regu-
lations." Note, supra note 64, at 398-99. The second prong requires a balancing of
several subjective and interrelated factors: "(1) The nature and strength of the plain-
tiff's challenge to the military determination; (2) The potential injury to the plaintiff if
review is refused; (3) The type and degree of anticipated interference with the military
function; (4) The extent to which the exercise of military expertise or discretion is in-
volved." Id. at 399. In contrast to review of military administrative action, the adjudi-
cation of military tort claims requires direct judicial intervention, which is forbidden.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12-14, 16.
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
71. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court in Chappell, opined: "It is
clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary
gress's constitutional authority over the military in Orloff v.
Willoughby:72
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for
setting up channels through which... grievances can be considered and fairly
settled rests upon the Congress and the President of the United States and his
subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a
separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires
that the judiciary be . . .scrupulous not to intervene with legitimate Army
matters .... 73
In Chappell, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the Constitution
contemplated two systems of justice--one for civilians, and one for
the military.74 Under this constitutional mandate, the unanimous
Court observed that "Congress has exercised its plenary authority
over the military, has enacted statutes regulating military life, and
has established a comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate
military life, taking into account the special patterns that define the
military structure."7 5 In Stanley, the majority emphasized the tex-
tual commitment: "What is distinctive here is the specificity of that
... grant of power, and the insistence (evident from the number of
Clauses devoted to the subject) with which the Constitution confers
authority over the Army, Navy, and militia upon the political
branches."76
The Court's perspective initially appears to preclude judicial re-
view of the military in almost every circumstance.77 However, the
control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Estab-
lishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military disci-
pline; and Congress and the courts have acted in conformity with this view." Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983).
72. 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (court denied habeus corpus to serviceman-physician who al-
leged he had been wrongfully inducted into the Army under the Doctor's Draft Act
since he had not been assigned to specialized duties nor given a commission as an
officer).
73. Id. at 93-94.
74. Chief Justice Burger continued: "The special status of the military has re-
quired, the Constitution has contemplated, Congress has created, and this Court has
long recognized two systems of justice, to some extent parallel: one for civilians and
one for military personnel." Chappell v. United States, 462 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1983).
75. Id. at 302.
76. United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3063 (1987) (footnote omitted).
77. Professor Wechsler observed, regarding the political question doctrine:
[A]ll the doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are called upon to
judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency of govern-
ment the autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that itself
requires an interpretation. Who for example, would contend that the civil
courts may properly review a judgment of impeachment when article I section
3 declares that the "sole Power to try" is in the Senate?... [T]he only proper
judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision is that the Constitu-
tion has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of gov-
ernment than the courts.
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9
(1959). Professor Wechsler's perspective on the textual commitment aspect of the doc-
trine would apparently preclude all judicial review once a textual commitment is
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preclusion properly applies only in the context of direct judicial in-
terference with military affairs (like that contemplated in the adjudi-
cation of intramilitary tort claims), rather than the review of military
administrative action.78 In fact, the Court has observed that it "has
never held ... that military personnel are barred from all redress in
civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of mil-
itary service." 79 The doctrine of intramilitary immunity proscribes
direct judicial interference with "the need for unhesitating and deci-
sive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by
enlisted personnel"o because responsibility for maintenance of this
special relationship has been constitutionally delegated to Con-
gressS--beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.
B. Judicial Expertise
The second prong of the political question analysis is born of pru-
dential concerns for the existence of "manageable [judicial] stan-
dards."8 2 In Coleman v.,Miller,8 3 members of the Kansas Legislature
challenged that body's ratification of a proposed amendment to the
found. Note, supra note 64, at 413 n.150. Commenting on Professor Wechsler's state-
ment, Professor Redish remarked: "[T]o be legitimate, a federal court's refusal to ad-
judicate a dispute between the political branches must be based on a substantive
constitutional analysis of the Constitution's allocation of authority." Redish, Absten-
tion, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71,
113 (1984). Professor Redish's analysis would certainly extend to the allocation of con-
stitutional authority as between the political branches and the judiciary. More re-
cently, Justice Rehnquist has opined: "[J]udicial deference . .. is at its apogee when
legislative action under the constitutional authority to raise and support armies and
make rules and regulations for the governance is challenged." Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)) (emphasis
added).
78. See supra note 68.
79. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983). In Stanley, the Court qualified
this statement by suggesting that "it referred to redress designed to halt or prevent the
constitutional violation rather than the award of money damages." United States v.
Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3063 (1987).
80. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
81. Chief Justice Burger implied that the legislative responsibility in the area of
military affairs is exclusive of the judiciary:
Congress, the constitutionally authorized source of authority over the military
system of justice, has not provided a damages remedy for claims by military
personnel that constitutional rights have been violated by a superior officer.
Any action to provide a judicial response by way of such a remedy would be
plainly inconsistent with Congress' authority in the field.
Id.
82. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939).
83. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
United States Constitution.84 In considering whether the time for
ratification had lapsed, the Supreme Court observed that there were
no criteria under either the Constitution or any statute upon which
to base a judicial determination.8 5 The Court reasoned that resolu-
tion of the issue would require the "appraisal of a great variety of rel-
evant conditions, political, social and economic, which can hardly be
said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a
court of justice."8 6 The Court concluded that the issue was essen-
tially political and therefore nonjusticiable.8 7
In Gilligan v. Morgan,8 8 a group of Kent State University students
sought judicial review of the Ohio National Guard's training patterns.
The Court stated that the judiciary lacks the requisite expertise to
adjudicate claims involving the training methods used by the mili-
tary.8 9 "The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are
essentially professional military judgments subject always to civilian
control of the Legislative and Executive branch.'9o However, in order
to clarify its position, the Court added a caveat that its decision was
not intended to imply that the conduct of the military is always be-
yond judicial review.9 1
In Gilligan, the Court was asked to review training methods which
were alleged to have precipitated the death of several Kent State stu-
84. The amendment was proposed by Congress in 1924, and was known as the
Child Labor Amendment. Id, at 435.
85. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 453.
86. Id at 453.
87. Id. at 454.
88. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
89. Id. at 10-11; see supra text accompanying note 61. In Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986) the Supreme Court was faced with a first amendment challenge to
military regulation. The petitioner, an orthodox Jew who was an ordained rabbi, was
prevented by the Air Force from wearing a yarmulke (skull cap) while in uniform.
The petitioner claimed the Air Force regulation violated his first amendment rights to
freely exercise his religion. Speaking for the majority, Justice Rehnquist touched
upon the issue of manageable judicial standards:
In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether military needs
justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must
give great deference to the relative importance of the military interest [cita-
tion omitted]. Not only are courts 'ill equipped to determine the impact upon
discipline that any . . . particular intrusion upon military authority might
have,' but military authorities have been charged by the Executive and Legis-
lative branches with carrying out our Nation's military policy.
Id at 508 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (quoting Warren, The
Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y. L. REV. 181, 187 (1962))). The Court concluded
that the Air Force regulation was valid notwithstanding the first amendment. Id. at
509-10.
90. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10 (emphasis in original).
91. Id at 11. It is unclear under what circumstances it would be appropriate for
the civil judiciary to directly review military conduct. A case involving military con-
duct directly violative of direction from the executive or legislative branch might be
justiciable. However, the Court has yet to address the question. See supra note 68.
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dents. The suit involved the use of military force on the civilian com-
munity. By contrast, intramilitary tort claims present questions
which are wholly divorced from civilian concerns and thus would
typically lie entirely beyond the knowledge and expertise of the civil
judiciary. The argument in support of the non-justiciability of such
claims is therefore especially compelling. Former Chief Justice Earl
Warren observed:
[I]t is indisputable that the tradition of our country, from the time of the
Revolution until now, has supported the military establishment's broad power
to deal with its own personnel. The most obvious reason is that courts are ill-
equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intru-
sion upon military authority might have. Many of the problems of the military
society are, in a sense, alien to the problems with which the judiciary is
trained to deal. 9
2
C. Prudential Considerations
The most compelling prudential consideration counselling against
civil adjudication of intramilitary claims is the nature of the relation-
ship between the judiciary and the other coordinate branches of the
federal government.93 The Supreme Court observed: "The nonjusti-
ciability of a political question is primarily a function of separation of
powers."9 4 Congress has exercised its constitutional authority under
article I, section 895 to create a comprehensive system of military jus-
tice 96 as well as an exstensive "no fault" compensation system 97 to
92. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 187 (1962).
93. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
94. Id at 210. Professor Redish, in a detailed discussion of judicial abstention, fo-
cused upon the doctrine's foundation:
The principle of separation of powers between the judicial and legislative
branches derives from the fundamental democratic principal of electoral ac-
countability .... The essential element of any democratic society is at least
some level of majoritarian self determination.... It has never been suggested,
however, that the judiciary may openly ignore a legislative judgment on any
grounds other than constitutionality.
Redish, supra note 77, at 76.
95. See supra text accompanying note 69.
96. The Uniform Cede of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-940 (West 1983), en-
acted by Congress in 1950, established court-martial jurisdiction over all ser-
vicemembers. Appeals from the military courts are heard by the Court of Military
Appeals. 10 U.S.C.A §§ 867, 876 (West 1982). Chief Justice Warren described the
Court of Military Appeals as the "civilian" Supreme Court "of the military." See War-
ren, supra note 92, at 188.
97. The Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987),
was enacted by Congress in 1958 to provide, among other things, benefits for injured
servicemembers. These benefits include free medical care at Veterans Administration
medical facilities, and disability pensions. The Supreme Court has described the VBA
as serving a dual purpose, "it not only provides a swift, efficient remedy for the injured
compensate those who sustain injury as a result of military service. If
the judiciary were to create an alternative remedy in this area, the
result would be "plainly inconsistent with Congress' authority in this
field."98
In both Feres 99 and Chappell,100 the Court discussed at length Con-
gress' constitutional authority over the military and its establishment
of remedies pursuant to that authority as justification for denying a
right of action for injury incident to service. Were the civil judiciary
to extend a remedy in addition to those created by Congress, the re-
sult would be "multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question,"10 the avoidance of which is a major objective of
the political question doctrine. This consideration has received spe-
cial emphasis "in the context of Congress' authority over national de-
fense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court
accorded Congress greater deference."102
The justiciability test of Baker v. Carr and its progeny is disjunc-
tive in application.103 Nevertheless, with regard to each of the three
factors considered, the foregoing analysis leads to the same conclu-
sion: an intramilitary tort claim presents a nonjusticiable political
question which the judiciary has no authority to decide.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The traditional policy justifications for intramilitary tort immunity
are rooted in the rationales enunciated by the Supreme Court in its
unanimous opinion in Feres.l0 4 As the previous analysis suggests,
however, the reasoning of the Feres court is no longer a sufficient
justification for the denial of a civil remedy to injured ser-
serviceman, but it also clothes the Government in the. . . 'Act's limitations-of-liability
provisions.'" Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
98. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983). The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly emphasized the primacy of the Legislature in the exercise of its delegated powers.
Chief Justice Burger has stated:
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each branch hav-
ing certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is" . . . it is equally--and emphatically-the exclusive province of Con-
gress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and
projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803)). Hence, the judiciary lacks the authority to interfere with an other-
wise constitutional exercise of power delegated by the Congress. Redish, supra note
77, at 77.
99. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
100. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305.
101. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
102. Chappell, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-
65 (1981)).
103. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
104. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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vicemembers. For instance, subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court abandoned the requirement of parallel private liability.105
Also, concerns regarding the irrationality of applying the tort law of
fifty different jurisdictions to a uniquely federal relationship have
failed to inhibit the imposition of tort liability to other federal em-
ployees, as well as members of the military who meet the "incident
to service" test.106 Finally, the significance of the alternative com-
pensation available under the Veterans' Benefit Act has been ques-
tioned in cases where a family member who may not be
independently eligible for benefits sustains the injury. 07 Because
the Feres factors are no longer persuasive the policies underlying mil-
itary tort immunity should be examined at a more fundamental level.
The threshold issue is whether a servicemember, injured through
the tortious conduct of another acting within the scope of his or her
duties, is entitled to relief. Certainly, few would assert that such in-
jury should go totally uncompensated. Public policy obviously favors
the compensation of injured servicemembers. In 1984 alone, the gov-
ernment expended $28.8 billion on veterans' benefits, of which $13.9
billion constituted compensatory benefits.108 Thus, the issue is not
whether the injured servicemember should be compensated, but
rather a determination of the appropriate mechanism for adjudicat-
ing claims for compensation, and for equitably allocating the govern-
ment's financial resources to ensure that as many deserving
claimants are compensated as possible.
The framers of the Constitution delegated responsibility for the
government and regulation of the military to Congress. Accordingly,
it is the responsibility of the legislative branch, not the judiciary, to
create the mechanism required to provide servicemembers with re-
dress for their claims. The judiciary lacks the institutional compe-
tence to formulate and execute a comprehensive system of providing
relief. As a practical matter, any judicial remedy would have to be
developed on a case-by-case basis, without the advantage of the broad
105. This rationale focused upon the notion that the FTCA was intended to waive
governmental immunity only to the extent that the United States would be liable in
tort if it were a private individual. The Feres court reasoned that since no parallel pri-
vate liability existed for intramilitary torts, such claims were not within the scope of
the FTCA. Later Court decisions abandoned this reasoning. See, e.g., Rayonier, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957); Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955); see also Zillman, supra note 1, at 508.
106. See Bennett, supra note 1, at 400-01.
107. See id at 401.
108. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 349 (1986 ed.).
overview accorded to Congress in enacting legislation. By contrast,
Congress possesses broad powers which enable it to fully investigate
causes of recurrent injury and create a well reasoned scheme of relief
which provides equitable compensation to all injured service-
members, whether or not their injury was tortiously inflicted. The
broad-based approach of Congress also permits it to concurrently con-
sider the ultimate objective of maintaining an effective military.
Perhaps the most important factor which must be weighed against
the public policy favoring compensation of injured servicemembers is
the maintenance of military discipline. The effectiveness of any mili-
tary organization rests upon a degree of discipline unparalleled in ci-
vilian life.109 The survival of the individual servicemember in battle,
as well as the survival of his comrades, depends upon unquestioning
response to command. General William Westmoreland observed:l10
Inherent in the concept of military discipline and necessary for the accom-
plishment of the military mission is an accepted superior-subordinate relation-
ship. In battlefield situations, a leader's plan of action cannot be debated.
Time usually does not permit discussion. The commander must know that his
orders will be carried out, for the soldier who shirks his task involves more
than his own life. The lives of others are affected, and the success of the mis-
sion may well be jeopardized. Conduct which detracts from the respect to-
ward and confidence in the superior weakens his authority and the loyalty he
needs in performing his job.'1 1
The discipline necessary to ensure efficient combat performance is
not confined solely to the battlefield. It must be maintained at all
times because of the unfortunate but constant possibility of war. 1 2
109. Professor Hirschhorn's analysis brings the necessity of discipline into sharp
focus:
The most distinctively military activity, and the one that places the greatest
strain on the serviceman, is ground combat. The combat infantryman faces
the continuing prospect of death, maiming, or injury while tired, hungry,
thirsty, and exposed to the worst extremes of climate. He is isolated from his
normal sources of esteem, affection, and sexual gratification, and suffers con-
stant, debilitating uncertainty about the intentions of the enemy and his own
superiors. The situation bluntly confronts him with the fact that he is a mere
means to his superiors' ends, of no intrinsic human worth to them, caught in
circumstances beyond his control. He must overcome his own fear, and he
must routinely commit acts that would be grossly immoral by his prior civil-
ian standards. Modern firepower compels troops to disperse and take cover
for protection, and the infantryman is often alone, unable to see what is hap-
pening around him and out of contact with his superiors. To perform effec-
tively, the infantryman must display both endurance and initiative while
frightened, exhausted, disgusted, and beyond the direct supervision of officers.
Hirschhorn, supra note 1, at 220-21 (footnotes omitted).
110. General Westmoreland is the former Chief of Staff of the United States Army.
111. Westmoreland, Military Justice-A Commander's Viewpoint, 10 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 5, 6 (1971).
112. Professor Hirschhorn continues:
By the time that servicemen reach the combat situation, their experience with
formal military discipline should have accustomed them to obedience by dem-
onstrating that the Army does have the power to detect and punish overt
resistance or non-compliance by individuals. One of the principal purposes of
basic training, for example, is to show the trainees just how easily they can be
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Discipline is a fundamental reality of military life, and the type and
degree of discipline involved are alien to most civilians.11 3 The spe-
cial relationship of superior to subordinate is the cornerstone of mili-
tary discipline and should remain free of interference by the civil
judiciary. The nonjusticiability of intramilitary tort claims is founded
upon this proposition.
The ultimate impact of judicial interference with this special rela-
tionship would be a matter of conjecture. However, the very thought
of the possible ramifications of civil liability for battlefield decision-
making might be enough to stifle bold initiatives. For instance, it
could lead to watered-down training exercises designed to minimize
the military's exposure to civil liability. Thus, a sensible approach
must necessarily ensure adequate and timely relief for the injured
servicemember while serving the policy considerations of civil tort
law. The most effective remedy would serve these ends while leaving
military discipline--and, consequently, military effectiveness-unen-
cumbered by civilian interference. The responsibility for creating
such a remedy is beyond the scope of the judiciary's constitutional
and practical authority; the regulation nl4 of intramilitary relation-
ships is properly the sole province of Congress.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY
The nonjusticiability of intramilitary tort claims does not leave ser-
vicemembers without recourse, nor does it create, as one commenta-
tor has suggested, a class of remediless wrongs.1 ' 5 The responsibility
for adequately compensating servicemembers injured incident to mil-
itary service lies with Congress, and ultimately, the electorate. One
fundamental justification for the political question doctrine is that
sensitive policy decisions should be made by those members of the
government who, unlike the judiciary, are subject to electoral
accountability.llG
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate, Congress has created reme-
dies which provide members of the military with adequate relief for
made to submit to the Army's authority. Moreover, pervasive authority does
not merely condition the individual to compliance; it also causes the primary
group to protect itself from organizational sanctions by turning against mem-
bers who are conspicuous deviants.
Hirschhorn, supra note 1, at 224 (footnotes omitted).
113. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
115. Comment, The Feres Doctrine, supra note 1, at 929.
116. See supra note 94.
injuries sustained incident to service. Civil tort law is generally rec-
ognized as a mechanism by which losses may be adjusted and com-
pensation afforded to an individual injured as the result of the
conduct of another. 1 7 To this end, two policies are dominant in civil
tort law: compensation 18 and deterrence. 119 Congress has enacted
two independent statutory mechanisms which further these policies
and provide a surrogate source of relief to servicemembers injured
incident to military service: the Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA),120 and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).121 Each of these stat-
utory schemes fulfills a separate function and a separate policy con-
sideration, and will be considered in turn.
A. Compensation
In enacting the VBA, Congress has provided a "no fault" compen-
sation system which provides veterans with both monetary compen-
sation 22 and medical care.123 Monetary compensation is paid on a
monthly basis at a rate commensurate with the servicemember's de-
gree of disability124 without regard to fault. Claims brought under
the VBA are adjudicated by the Veterans' Administration (VA)125 on
an ex parte basis.126A claimant may request a hearing, 127 present evi-
dence or testimony, 28 and may request administrative review of any
decision.129 Although appellate review of VA decisions is extremely
limited, it is available in certain narrow circumstances. 3 0 In Stencel,
the Supreme Court characterized the VBA as a "dual purpose" com-
117. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971).
118. Id
119. Id. § 4, at 23.
120. See supra note 97.
121. See supra note 96.
122. The Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 310, 314, 322, 334, 342 (West 1979),
provides for fixed rates of recovery based upon the degree of injury suffered. See
Note, Intramilitary Tort Law, supra note 1, at 998 n.28.
123. Under provisions of the VBA, any veteran may receive medical services for a
service-connected disability, and a veteran who has a service-connected disability of
50% or more may receive medical services for any disability. 38 U.S.C.A. § 612 (West
Supp. 1987).
124. I& §§ 314, 334 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987).
125. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1986).
126. Id.
127. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c) (1986).
128. Id. § 3.103(b).
129. Id. § 3.104(e).
130. Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) (West 1979), Veterans' Administration decisions
are "final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall
have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision .. " I& In 1974, the Supreme
Court narrowed the scope of this statute somewhat and established a right to limited
judicial review in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). The Court observed that
review is proper where "[t]he questions of law presented in [the] proceedings arise
under the Constitution, not under the statute whose validity is challenged." Id. at 367
(quoting Robison v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 848, 853 (D. Mass. 1973)).
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pensation scheme providing a "swift, efficient remedy for the injured
serviceman" while placing an "upper limit of liability for the Govern-
ment as to service-connected injuries."13 1
Although one would expect a statutory disability pension to fall
short of the compensation a civil action might yield, close analysis
and a direct comparison render a different conclusion.132 For exam-
ple, consider a hypothetical thirty-five-year-old sergeant in the Army,
at pay grade E-7, with a dependent spouse. Assume this ser-
vicemember has been totally blinded in a service-related accident.
The servicemember would recover $1,856 per month133 for life. As-
suming that this individual is male, his life expectancy is 38.2
years.1 34 Thus, he would recover approximately $850,000135 over his
lifetime. In addition, the veteran would be entitled to $82 per month
for his spouse 136 during the serviceman's life, and $616 per month 137
after his death. Assuming the spouse is also thirty-five years old, her
131. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
132. There are difficulties in comparing a VBA disability pension with a civil court
judgment. The VBA pension resembles a lifetime annuity which must be discounted
to present value in order to achieve a strict quantitative comparison with a civil judg-
ment, which is typically paid in a lump sum. Professor Posner recommends that the
appropriate discount rate is the prevailing interest rate on long term government
bonds, since it closely approximates the return the recipient would realize if he were
to invest a lump-sum disbursement in an annuity from an insurance company. See R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 6.13, at 148 (2nd ed. 1977). The prevailing in-
terest rate for 30-year treasury bonds was approximately nine percent at the time of
this writing. Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1987, at 20, col. 2.
A further difficulty exists with regard to civil judgment statistics-the verdict infor-
mation does not disclose the actual breakdown as to what is being compensated (i.e.
pain and suffering, lost future earnings, or future medical care). Some of the compo-
nents of a damage award would be routinely discounted to present value if a detailed
breakdown of the award's elements were available (e.g., lost earnings and medical
care). For a detailed discussion, see R. POSNER, supra, at § 6.13.
Additionally, the average damage verdict and the VBA pension would probably dif-
fer as to the duration of delay between the time of injury and the time of the award.
As such, a further present value adjustment would be required to facilitate a strict
quantitative comparison. The reader should accordingly bear the foregoing discussion
in mind and view the comparisons set forth in subsequent footnotes and text. In order
to avoid elaborate assumptions regarding the civil judgment statistics, textual analysis
will be presented in unadjusted form and rounded to the nearest hundred-dollar
increment.
133. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 314(n), 334 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987).
134. Ordinary Life Annuity Table, 26 C.F.R. § 1.72-9 (1979) (Table I). This table is
used to calculate income tax liability for lifetime annuities similar to a VBA disability
pension.
135. Over his 38.2-year life-span, the serviceman would receive approximately 458
payments of $1,856 each, totalling $850,048.
136. 38 U.S.C.A. § 315(1)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
137. 38 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West Supp. 1987).
life expectancy is 40 years.138 She, therefore, would likely recover
$51,100 in dependency compensation.139 This hypothetical service-
man's aggregate recovery would total $901,100,140 and if he had de-
pendent children, they would be eligible for additional benefits.141 In
addition to a disability pension, this serviceman would be entitled to
free medical care for life, regardless of whether the need for such
care is related to his service-connected disability.142
By contrast, a similarly situated civil litigant would recover an av-
erage verdict of $2,095,39514--if his case went to the jury and the lit-
igant prevailed. Of course, a sizeable portion of this lump-sum
payment,144 normally one-third, would likely be taken by the liti-
gant's attorney as a contingency fee. This would leave the litigant
with $1,403,915145 from which litigation expenses must be deducted.
From the balance, the litigant must make provision for his own fu-
ture medical expenses. 146 Assuming the litigant's case prevails, his fi-
nancial recovery is more than that of the VBA pension recipient.
138. See supra note 134.
139. Over the serviceman's 38.2-year life-span the spouse would receive approxi-
mately 458 payments of $82 totalling $37,556 and approximately 22 payments of $616
each, totalling $13,552 after his death, for a grand total of $51,108 in dependency
compensation.
140. Total compensation equals $850,000 plus $51,100.
141. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C.A. § 315 (West Supp. 1987) (providing for additional compen-
sation for dependent children during the lifetime of the disabled veteran); id. § 413
(providing for direct compensation to children of a deceased veteran where there is no
surviving spouse).
142. The VBA provides: "the Administrator may furnish such medical services as
the Administrator determines are needed - A) to any veteran for a service-connected
disability... and B) for any disability of a veteran who has a service-connected disabil-
ity rated at 50 percent or more." 38 U.S.C.A. § 612(a) (West Supp. 1987).
143. According to statistics prepared by Jury Verdict Research Inc., expectancy val-
ues for total blindness are as follows:
Civil Recovery
Midpoint Verdict ... $1,500,000
Probable Range ..... $500,000 to $3,110,000
Verdict Range ...... $150,000 to $7,500,000
Average Verdict ... $2,095,395
1B PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK, IV No. 313, at 2957 (Jury Verdict Re-
search, Inc. 1986).
144. Although a lump-sum damages recovery appears to provide superior compen-
sation to periodic payments, there are viable arguments to the contrary. One commen-
tator has observed: "the function of damages being to restore the plaintiff's former
position as far as practically possible, compensation for future losses should not antici-
pate the moment they occur; prospective earnings are accordingly compensable by cor-
responding periodic payments." Fleming, Damages: Capital or Rent?, 19 U. TORONTO
L.J. 295, 299 (1969). This rationale provides a good theoretical basis for periodic pay-
ments (usually referred to as structured settlements in the civil arena). A rationale
that is perhaps more realistic focuses on the likelihood that recipients of lump-sum
awards may "spend their award[s] in a lump sum (sic) just as they received [them]."
I&. at 300 (quoting A. CONARD, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 84
(1964).
145. An attorney's contingency fee of 33.3% would equal approximately $691,480.
146. According to Fleming:
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However, the vast majority of cases settle prior to trial for less than
might be realized if the case went before a jury,147 and only if the
litigant can establish the requisite indicia of liability of the defendant.
The servicemember who proceeds under the VBA, unlike the civil
litigant, is freed from the burden of establishing liability. The rele-
vant inquiries are limited to whether the servicemember was actually
injured, the degree of the injury, and whether the injury was sus-
tained during military service.148 In the example above, the service-
man is guaranteed his recovery as long as his injury is service-related,
Possible future changes in the victim's physical condition present an ele-
ment of uncertainty most frequently encountered in assessing damages and
least predictable alike in incident and extent.... The necessity, under a once-
and-for-all system of damage awards, to predict the future in this regard im-
poses [a] serious handicap on the administration of justice .... The guess,
however "informed," may be belied by the turn of events, to the tragic detri-
ment of the victim who will to that extent go uncompensated.
Fleming, supra note 144, at 303. This passage underscores the importance of the
VBA's provision for free future medical care.
147. Professor Marc Galanter has observed:
[M]ost civil cases in American courts are settled. That is, they terminate in an
outcome agreed upon by the parties, sometimes formally ratified by the court,
sometimes only noted as settled, and sometimes, from the court's viewpoint,
abandoned.... Of those claims that become lawsuits, settlement is the preva-
lent mode of disposition. Of the cases in ten courts studied by the Civil Litiga-
tion Research Project, about 88% were settled; only 9% went to trial.
Galanter, Reading The Landscape Of Disputes: What We Know And Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4, 27-28 (1983).
Commenting on a study, of New York area courts of similar size and scope, Professor
Marc Franklin of Columbia University Law School observed that "[r]ecovery is greater
in suits that reach trial than in suits that are settled before trial." Franklin, Chanin &
Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury
Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (1961).
148. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 314, 334 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). In VA proceedings, a ser-
vicemember must "submit evidence sufficient to justify a belief in a fair and impartial
mind that [his] claim is well-grounded." 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1986). VBA claimants must
meet what is essentially a preponderance of the evidence standard, but if a "reasonable
doubt arises" it is resolved in favor of' the claimant. Id. One commentator has
observed:
Although the same result might ultimately have been reached under Admin-
istrative and common law standards, the standard applied by the VA was in-
tended to be far less stringent. This difference arguably reflects the
differences in the agencies and the judiciary's broader policy aims. While tort
law seeks to deter tortious conduct and compensate injured persons, the VA
seeks primarily to assist veterans by compensating them for injuries incurred
during military service. In a broader sense, the VA, as an administrative
agency, also seeks to ensure fair and accurate decisionmaking, the expeditious
and economical resolution of claims, and claimants' overall satisfaction with
the administrative process.
Note, A Critique of the Veterans Administration Claims Process, 52 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 533, 552 (1986).
regardless of who is at fault, unless he is found guilty of willful mis-
conduct. In contrast, the civil litigant, in order to be assured of com-
pensation, must ensure that liability is established on the part of
some entity or individual who can afford to satisfy the judgment. Ad-
ditionally, the serviceman, unlike the civil litigant, does not have the
burden of paying attorney's fees; nor does the serviceman have to un-
derwrite costly investigations and expert witness fees. Furthermore,
although the VA is not a model of administrative efficiency, in all
probability, a servicemember's claim will be processed in far less time
than it would take for a similar claim to come before a civil court.
The civil recovery hypothetical set forth above is an optimistic
forecast. In reality, a civil litigant would probably settle for much
less, with all the delays and expenses incident to civil litigation. 149
Thus, the VBA remedy provided by Congress generally fulfills its ob-
jective of providing fair and adequate compensation to injured ser-
vicemembers, while concurrently avoiding direct interference with
military discipline.150
Although the VBA works very well in the aggregate, both the Act
itself, as well as those who administer it, are not infallible. The ad-
ministrative difficulties attendant with the Act may be appreciated
by considering the treatment under the VBA of two large classes of
injured veterans: those exposed to atmospheric radiation during and
immediately after World War II,151 and those exposed to the toxic de-
foliant Agent Orange during the Vietnam conflict.152 In order to
qualify for disability pensions, veterans must establish that their in-
jury was service-related by proving that a causal relationship existed
between the injury and their military service. 5 3 Unfortunately, both
classes of veterans in these cases were unable to establish a direct
149. See supra note 147.
150. Under the provisions of the VBA, benefits are limited to honorably discharged
veterans. 38 U.S.C.A. § 310 (West 1982). Hence, it is likely that a dishonorably dis-
charged veteran could go wholly uncompensated. Perhaps a more equitable result
could be attained by limiting dishonorably discharged veterans to only disability com-
pensation and medical care for service-related injuries and disqualifying them from the
remaining statutory veterans benefits.
151. See, e.g., Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983); Jaffee v.
United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982); Hampton
v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Ark. 1983); see also Note, Radiation Injury
and the Atomic Veteran: Shifting the Burden of Proof on Factual Causation, 32 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 933 (1981).
152. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'cl, 818 F.2d 145 2d (1987); see also Comment, When a Veteran "Wants" Un-
cle Sam: Theories of Recovery for Servicemembers Exposed to Hazardous Substances,
31 AM. U.L. REV. 1095 (1982).
153. Under sections 310 and 331 of the Act, a veteran is entitled to compensation
"[flor disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of
duty . . . ." 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 310, 331 (West 1979). The two sections are substantially
identical, and apply to wartime and peacetime, respectively.
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causal relationship. They were only able to establish general causa-
tion based upon statistical inferences that the respective radiation or
toxin caused their disabiities.54 Having failed to establish an enti-
tlement to a VBA pension, many of these veterans turned to the
courts and were equally unsuccessful.155 Congress, however, under
pressure from a concerned electorate, recognized the predicament of
these two classes of veterans and enacted the Veterans' Dioxin and
Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Actlsa in October of
1984. Congress's action to supplement the VBA and to ensure fair
and equitable treatment of these veterans was pursuant to its consti-
tutional responsibility and consistent with the political question anal-
ysis above.
Some commentators have challenged the adequacy of VBA com-
pensation in certain circumstances and see an urgent need for paral-
lel and redundant civil adjudication and relief. 5 7 However, any
future difficiencies in VBA recovery would be best addressed by leg-
islative amendment of the statute, or judicial supervision of the VA's
administration of the Act, rather than the creation of an independent
civil cause of action. The primary benefit of the VBA's "no fault" ap-
proach is that it eliminates the need for direct civilian intervention in
military affairs while providing the injured servicemember with fast,
inexpensive, and equitable recovery.
154. See Note, supra note 148, at 550 (analysis of causation difficulties encountered
by veterans injured by Agent Orange); Note, supra note 151, at 957 (analysis of causa-
tion difficulties encountered by veterans injured by atomic weapon test).
155. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
156. 98 Stat. 542 (1984). Section 3 sets forth the purpose of the Act:
The purpose of this act is to ensure that Veteran's Administration disability
compensation is provided to veterans who were exposed during service in the
Armed Forces in the Republic of Vietnam to a herbicide containing dioxin or
to ionizing radiation in connection with atmospheric nuclear tests, or in con-
nection with the American occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, Japan, for
all disabilities arising after that service that are connected, based on sound sci-
entific and medical evidence, to such service ....
Id at § 3.
157. One commentator has asserted that the intramilitary remedial system of com-
pensation and deterrence cannot withstand institutional military pressure. Note, In-
tramilitary Tort Law, supra note 1, at 999. Recognizing the need for a balance
between the military's interest in maintaining discipline and civilian norms, however,
he advocates federal court adjudication of intramilitary tort claims only in cases where
culpability greater than simple negligence is alleged, and the plaintiff is not an active-
duty servicemember. Id at 1010. While the danger exists that deterrence may suffer
from institutional pressure, it is hard to imagine how the military establishment could
influence the adjudication of VBA claims.
B. Deterrence
Perhaps the most appropriate avenue for fulfilling the deterrent
function of civil tort law is article 138 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, the military's grievance procedure.158 Under this article,
any servicemember who believes himself wronged by his command-
ing officer may complain to any superior commissioned officer who
then forwards the complaint to an officer exercising general court
martial juridiction over the officer who allegedly committed the
wrongdoing.59 A copy of the complaint and of any related proceed-
ings is sent to the Secretary concerned.s0 Even critics of the existing
remedies for intramilitary tort claims agree that article 138 is "com-
petent to punish and deter isolated misconduct of lower level officers
that sharply departs from the military's own norms of behavior."61
However, widespread misconduct countenanced at the highest level
of the military establishment is beyond the scope of the UCMJ.
In instances of widespread misconduct like human drug testing,162
or radiation experimentation, 163 direct congressional review is clearly
justified since responsibility for such large scale misconduct is vested
in the executive branch and subject to both congressional and electo-
ral review. 164 The most effective method of achieving deterrence in
aggregate military behavior combines a congressional supervisory
role over the military, and the internal disciplinary rules and sanc-
tions of the UCMJ. Those wfio advocate a civil damages remedy to
158. Article 138 is codified at 10 U.S.C.A. § 938 (West 1982). As an alternative, the
command hierarchy may initiate an action for dereliction of duty under article 92 of
the UCMJ, codified at 10 U.S.C.A. § 892(3) (West 1982). "A military member who
knowingly fails to perform a duty, whether the duty be imposed by an administrative
regulation, a custom of the service, or lawful order, may be prosecuted under Article
92(3) for dereliction of duty." United States v. Heyward, 22 M.J. 35, 36 (1986).
159. 10 U.S.C.A. § 938 (West 1982).
160. Id.
161. Note, Intramilitary Tort Law, supra note 1, at 1000.
162. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 972 (1982).
163. See, e.g., Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated in
parA rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
164. Although congressional authority to conduct investigations and compel testi-
mony is not explicitly recognized in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has held the
investigatory power to be "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function." See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). Professor Tribe has
observed:
Congress, of course, possesses the power to investigate and to compel testi-
mony in connection with the exercise of its powers of self-regulation. But
more significantly, Congress may also investigate any matter concerning
which the Constitution authorizes it to legislate. "[T]he power of inquiry...
is as penetrating and far reaching as the potential power to enact and appro-
priate [funds] under the Constitution."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-19, at 376 (1988) (quoting Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959)); see also Landis, Constitutional Limitations of
the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1926).
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deter widespread military misconduct fail to recognize that such an
award would primarily punish the taxpayer. Even if an individual
commander were held personally liable, the burden of satisfying a
large civil judgment would fall to the Treasury, and ultimately to the
taxpayer. If the UCMJ is an adequate deterrent for individual tor-
tious conduct,165 and the servicemember is adequately compensated
by the VBA,166 then what futher deterrence could a parallel and re-
dundant civil cause of action provide? Such an action would have a
generalized deterrent effect upon the aggregate institutional behavior
responsible for broad-scoped military misconduct, but at what cost?
By enacting the UCMJ, Congress created a comprehensive frame-
work for military discipline which not only serves to discourage
wrongful conduct, but enhances military effectiveness. General
Westmoreland observed:
Military law in contrast to civilian law... must have a motivating as well as a
preventive function. In civilian life, if an employee disobeys the instructions
of an employer or is absent from work, he may lose his job. On the other
hand, the potential consequence of these types of conduct in the military are
infinitely more serious to soldiers, to the military organization as a whole, and
to the Nation. Such conduct must be deterred by criminal sanctions.1 6 7
The recognition of a civil remedy would inevitably conflict with the
multifaceted role played by the UCMJ. In instances where the
UCMJ is an insufficient deterrent, it is the constitutional responsibil-
ity of Congress to produce a mechanism to punish broad-scoped mili-
tary misconduct in a manner which will preserve the discipline and
effectiveness of the Armed Forces. It is not a responsibility which
may be delegated to the civil judiciary.
VII. CONCLUSION
Intramilitary tort immunity is not merely the result of a judicially
created exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. It is much more
accurate to regard it as a function of the constitutionally mandated
allocation of responsibilities among the three branches of the federal
government. The Constitution grants to Congress plenary authority
over the regulation of military affairs because of the special and
unique requirements of military discipline. The Congress has acted,
consistent with its authority, and created a comprehensive statutory
scheme to discharge its constitutional responsibility. It has enacted
165. See supra text accompanying note 161.
166. See supra notes 122-156 and accompanying text.
167. Westmoreland, supra note 111, at 6.
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to regulate the internal disci-
pline of the armed forces, and the Veterans' Benefit Act, to provide
compensation and medical care to those injured incident to military
service.
Given the textual commitment of military affairs to the legislative
branch of the federal government, Congress's substantial activity in
the field, and in light of the judiciary's lack of expertise in military
affairs, intramilitary tort claims are properly situated beyond the ju-
risdiction of the civil courts. If the statutory remedies prove inade-
quate, then it is Congress's responsibility, under the pressure of
periodic review by the electorate, to improve the administative reme-
dies already in place and insure the disciplinary accountability of mil-
itary personnel.
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